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Abstract—Ephemeral messaging applications are growing 
increasingly popular on the digital mobile market. However, 
they are not always used with good intentions. Criminals may 
see a gateway into private communication with each other 
through this transient application data. This could negatively 
impact criminal court cases for evidence, or civil matters. To 
find out if messages from such applications can indeed be 
recovered or not, a forensic examination of the device would be 
required by the law enforcement authority. This paper reports 
mobile forensic investigations of ephemeral data from a wide 
range of applications using both proprietary and freeware 
forensic tools. Both Android and iOS platforms were used in the 
investigation. The results from the investigation uncovered 
various artefacts from the iOS device including account 
information, contacts, and evidence of communication between 
users. The Android device uncovered evidence of 
communications, and several media files assumed to be deleted 
within a storage cache in the Android file system. The forensic 
tools used within the investigations were evaluated using 
parameters from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology’s (NIST) mobile tool test assertions and test plan.  
Keywords— Mobile forensics; Digital forensics; NIST 
measurements; Oxygen Forensics; Ephemeral messaging apps; 
EMAs. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The growth of ephemeral messaging applications (EMAs) 
is also posing a problem to the enforcement of law, with apps 
being proving a concern for activities like cyberbullying [1] or 
even high-end criminal activity like terrorism [2]. Criminals 
may use regular chatting applications, but there is a growing 
opportunity within the mobile application market for 
criminals to use ephemeral messaging applications, which 
allow users to send messages/multimedia etc. to each other 
with the messages only lasting for a certain period of time [3]. 
Barker [4] reported that criminals are moving away from dark 
web interactions and onto EMAs such as Facebook 
Messenger, Snapchat, and Wire etc. It is thought this is 
happening because data in these applications is known to 
delete itself, which is prime for criminal communications. For 
example, Snapchat allows users to send ‘Snaps’ to each other 
containing pictures, which are deleted once the recipient user 
closes the message [5].  
It is not just criminals using EMAs. Mobile phones are an 
essential part of modern-day life. According to the Global 
System for Mobile Communications [6], there were five 
billion mobile users in the world by the second quarter of 
2017, with a prediction that another 620 million people will 
become mobile phone users by 2020, together that would 
account for almost three quarters of the world population. Due 
to the increasing popularity in mobile phones, there is 
naturally an increasing concern over mobile security and how 
safe communication between individuals or groups is. It is 
known that EMAs can be used in civil concerns such as 
evidence of liability in business [7]. Most notably, the United 
States department of justice imposed heavy restrictions on the 
use of EMAs by employees in 2018 as part of a scheme to 
reduce illegal bribery within businesses [8]. The rationale for 
the use of the applications was reported to be more complex 
than covering tracks, and that employees themselves had 
started to turn to using them of their own accord for reasons 
such as more reliable service. From this, it is clear that the use 
of EMAs is moving from the use of criminals and privacy 
advocates, to the general populace as well. 
The two most popular EMAs on the mobile market 
currently are Snapchat and Facebook Messenger. According 
to Constine [9], Snapchat has a daily user total of 190 million 
users. According to Noyes [10], Facebook messenger has an 
average daily user intake of 2.1 billion users. The statistics 
show a high intake of users within these EMAs. With the ever-
growing ephemeral market, it is vital to both civil matters and 
criminal cases to find out just how truthful the applications are 
about data being deleted and unrecoverable. 
With all the opportunities for new crimes to be committed 
through growing technology, it is crucial to ensure law 
enforcement agencies have the appropriate software and 
methods to deal with these crimes.  This paper will report 
forensic investigations of two mobile phones: one on an 
Android and the other on iOS platforms. The Android device 
was rooted; however, the iPhone was not jail broken. This will 
give an interesting insight to the investigation as different 
amounts of data may be recovered according to if the device 
is rooted or not. This paper will be using a variety of forensic 
tools to extract the mobile devices as well as comparing and 
examining each tool according to the NIST Measurements 
Mobile Device Tool Test Assertions and Test Plan [11]. The 
main contributions include a taxonomy of tools for forensic 
 analysis of mobile platforms, along with hands-on tests of 
these tools on several Android and iOS messaging apps. The 
paper's results cover the relative effectiveness of the forensic 
frameworks, as well as various interesting security findings 
among the mobile apps. 
The remainder of the paper will be organised as follows: 
Section II will discuss existing research in relation to mobile 
phone forensics, including forensic tools and ephemeral data. 
The methodology used during the analysis process will be 
discussed in Section III. Results and analysis will be reported 
in Section IV. Finally, Section V will conclude the paper and 
include possible future work. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is already a vast amount of research on mobile 
forensics in general, which includes comparing forensic tools, 
performing different types of mobile acquisitions and 
focusing on particular pieces of data within the mobile device.  
There is also work completed on non-EMAs, such as Ovens 
et al. [12] conducted a forensic analysis on Kik Messenger on 
iOS. While there have been similar studies in a wide range of 
apps, the focus of this review is to highlight the findings in 
extraction of artefacts from the apps, which are specifically 
ephemeral. 
One study undertaken by Sathe et al. [13] provided a broad 
overview of the available forensic acquisition methods for 
mobile device forensics, including several freeware options. 
The study undertook comprehensive analysis of both physical 
and logical data acquisition options and compared those 
options via several categories, i.e., Cost, Accuracy, Data 
Integrity, Training required, OS reliance, Root required etc., 
all of which would prove useful for identifying the practicality 
of the tools/techniques in professional scenarios, as well as the 
forensic soundness of the techniques in question, a pertinent 
characteristic when dealing with more disruptive techniques, 
such as those which require root access, as any alteration to 
the data stored within a device/image may well remove the 
reliability of a given piece of evidence in the eyes of the court. 
The results of the study showed that of the chosen forensic 
tools, AFLogical, Andriller and Dr. Fone toolkit, each 
provided evidence data in areas, which the other was lacking, 
leading to the conclusion that the use of multiple forensic tools 
in a given mobile forensic investigation may well be ideal.  
Azhar et al. [14] conducted a forensic experiment of two 
EMAs: Telegram and Wickr using Autopsy and logically 
acquiring a database file, as well as performing a RAM dump. 
Results showed that the application ‘Wickr’ stored received 
messages in encrypted “wic” files. The RAM dump recovered 
username information from Wickr and artefacts from 
Telegram. This investigation was an Ephemeral application 
comparison using Android platforms. The investigation more 
looked into packages and files within the application itself 
instead of using a mobile forensic tool. This would be 
interesting for future work as well as perhaps performing the 
same investigatory analysis on an iOS device. 
Al-Hadadi et al. [15] forensically investigated a mobile 
device, an iPhone 4 running iOS 5.0.1 previously jailbroken 
by the mobile phone owner, as a part of a real legal case. The 
case was from the Sultanate of Oman, and the aim of the 
investigation was to forensically examine the iPhone to 
determine if the device had been hacked and sent messages 
over the application ‘WhatsApp’ out to the owner’s contact 
list. In the investigation, the ISP report of the device was 
observed and examined, and two forensic tools were used to 
extract and examine mobile data, one tool being the Universal 
Forensic Extraction Device’s (UFED) physical analyser 
Cellebrite, and the other being the Oxygen Forensic Suite. The 
credibility of both tools is highly regarded by computer 
forensic experts. Results showed that Cellebrite recovered 
more forensic evidence than Oxygen, including call log 
artefacts, SMS messages, web history, etc. 
Another study, by Umar et al. [16] investigated the 
specific forensic evidence recoverable from the use of 
WhatsApp, a popular secure messaging application. The study 
took a rooted mobile device with Android 5.0.1 and used it in 
communications with a second device in order to simulate the 
standard daily use of the application. The mobile device was 
then forensically analysed by 3 different mobile forensic tools: 
WhatsApp DB/Key extractor, Belkasoft Evidence and 
Oxygen Forensic Detective 6.4.0.67. In addition to comparing 
the results of each tool’s analysis, the tools were assessed by 
various levels of the NIST Mobile device tool test assertions 
[11], a set of test requirements and guidelines produced to 
assist in the evaluation of mobile forensic tools. Each tool was 
assessed by all the baseline assessments and a select number 
of the optional assessments, before comparing the tools by the 
number of assessments they passed. The results of the study 
revealed that Oxygen Forensic Detective provided the most 
forensically valuable data, managing to identify evidence of 
the test data in both logical and physical extraction, and passed 
the most assessment parameters put against it by the NIST 
guidelines, failing only five out of the twenty-two assertions 
and functionality tests. 
A study undertaken by Naughton et al. [17] provided an 
investigation into data left by specific apps on mobile and 
personal devices. Said study utilised two mobile devices, 
using Android and IOS respectively, alongside a windows 10 
based laptop using an Android emulator. The applications 
selected for the study included various shared and device/OS 
specific apps, including two ephemeral apps: Snapchat and 
Instagram. Each device was used to gather forensically 
valuable data before undergoing forensic analysis, after which 
the data would be deleted to simulate a criminal covering their 
tracks and would undergo analysis once more. The study 
showed detailed information of what each forensic tool could 
recover from the test devices, with subcategories for each 
specific application, device and file type. While less focussed  
on the tools utilised during analysis, this study put heavy focus 
into the realism of the forensic analysis within the experiment, 
going as far to consult digital forensic specialists and 15 
separate police forces within England and Wales to ensure the 
experiment would prove as realistic a scenario as possible, a 
level of justification lacking in every other study found. The 
results of the study showed that the laptop and the iPhone 
provided the most forensically valuable data through analysis, 
and, more relevantly, that both EMAs used in the study, 
Snapchat and Instagram, provided no recoverable data that the 
 chosen forensic tools, Cellebrite UFED and Autopsy, could 
identify. 
As can be seen from this brief review of the literature, 
there is not much reported literature in extraction of ephemeral 
artefacts especially on iOS platforms. This paper will 
contribute to investigate artefacts recovery from both iOS and 
Android using wide range of EMAs. Comparisons will be 
made in evaluation of artefacts recovered using various tools 
following the guidelines by the NIST Measurements Mobile 
Device Tool Test Assertions and Test Plan [11]. The paper's 
results cover the relative effectiveness of the forensic 
frameworks, as well as various interesting security findings 
among several Android and iOS messaging apps. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Methodology section will detail choice of devices, chosen 
applications, forensics tools used and investigation process 
including the testing methodologies using NIST 
measurements. The investigation was carried out according to 
the four good practice guidelines of the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) [18]. For example, the third principle 
of the guidelines state that an audit trail should be recorded 
throughout the investigation in a manner, such that a third 
party could recreate the steps taken in the investigation and get 
the same results.  
A. Chosen Devices  
The two mobile devices used within the investigation was 
an iOS device: iPhone 6s [19], and an Android device: 
Vodafone VF695 [20]. According to Jkielty [21], there is just 
a 2.3% difference in UK in the market share between Android 
and iOS devices, with the iOS market having the edge. 
Vodaphone was running an Android 4.4.2 (KitKat) OS and 
iPhone had iOS 9. To investigate wide range of exploits, one 
of the phones was rooted (Android).   Having the root level 
access, it was hoped to gain more access to recover detail 
artefacts, including deleted files. In case of root level access, 
while forensic soundness can be questioned, the artefacts 
could still be valuable giving clues to further direction of 
investigation, which eventually may lead to gather concrete 
evidences to be presented in court with sufficient justification. 
B. Ephemeral Applications  
A wide range of ephemeral messaging apps were selected 
for the investigation as listed in Table I. Some applications are 
more popular (Snapchat for iOS and Facebook Messenger for 
Android) than the others but they all varied in their ephemeral 
features and target audiences. Details of these applications are 
given next. 
1) iOS Applications: Applications as listed for iOS in 
Table  I were all chosen for different reasons. Snapchat is one 
of the most popular EMAs. According to Omnicore [28], 
more than 25% of mobile phone users are on Snapchat, with 
71% of the users being aged between 17 to 24. Cyberdust, 
was chosen due to the difference in its ephemeral features 
compared to other apps. The encrypted messages within the 
app delete themselves between users after 24 hours of it being 
sent [23]. The application also has other uses, such as a 
“watchdog” feature where users can check their email 
addresses to see if any data breaches have been completed. 
Another feature is known as “Stealth Search”, where users 
can search the Internet privately, supposedly without any 
cookie trackers or trace remnants. This application was 
selected for the investigation as it creates ephemeral data, and 
it has many different functions, which allows the user to use 
the application for multi-purpose functions. 
TABLE I.  MOBILE DEVICE AND APPLICATIONS 
Mobile used 
Ephemeral Messaging Apps 
App Name  Version 
iPhone 6s  
Snapchat [22] 10.55.1 
Cyberdust [23] 5.6.1.1049 
Confide [24] 8.3.1 
Vodafone 
VF695  
Facebook Messenger 
[25] 
215.1.0.21.1
01 
Signal [26] 4.39.4 
Wire [27] 3.30 
Confide [24] 5.9.5 
 
The final application, Confide [24], was chosen because of 
its end to end message encryption between users. 
Furthermore, the application does not allow screenshots to be 
taken from users. The messages between users are self-
destructing once the recipient has read the message, and the 
user can only read the message by swiping down on the 
message on the screen to view it. Furthermore, the user can 
adjust the settings to change the ephemeral nature of the 
messages, if a message is not opened within 48 hours, the 
content of the message will delete itself regardless. All of 
these features would create an interesting investigation, as the 
application advertises very strong messaging security, so it 
would be intriguing to test the security through this forensic 
investigation. 
2) Android Applications: Like iOS, Confide was also 
used for the Android investigation. Among other 
applications,  Facebook Messenger is one of the most popular 
EMAs on the market with a similar popularity to Snapchat, 
as used on the iOS device. According to Google Play[29], as 
of March 2020 Facebook Messenger has over one billion 
downloads on the Android market. Facebook Messenger has 
a recent implementation of a new feature, which is a secret 
conversations function. It can facilitate encrypted and 
ephemeral communications between two parties, utilising the 
signal messaging protocol as previously used in the 
application ‘Signal’ description. The ephemeral features exist 
as a set of optional timers, with 11 delay options between 5 
seconds and a day. 
Signal is an open source encrypted messaging application 
with ephemeral capabilities, developed by the company of the 
same name. As a company, Signal is responsible for 
producing an encryption-based messaging protocol, also by 
the same name, which is utilised by multiple other secure 
messaging applications like WhatsApp and Facebook 
Messengers secret conversations feature [30]. Signal’s 
ephemeral capabilities come in the form of an optional timer 
to set for messages, with 11 different settings between five 
 seconds and one week delays for removal. All of this 
information makes it a perfect EMA for forensic investigation. 
The next application was Wire, which is a secure 
messaging application developed by Wire Swiss [27] and 
includes ephemeral messaging features. The application is 
targeted for use in business, with a majority of its promotional 
descriptions detailing secure communications between teams 
of employees, and further detailing its free version as ideal for 
home or family use. The ephemeral capabilities of Wire exist 
as a set of 6 optional timers between 10 seconds and 4 weeks 
delay. Its popularity is around twice as much as Confide, with 
over 1 million downloads on the Google play store. 
C. Forensic Tools 
Oxygen Forensic Detective Enterprise [31] version 
10.3.0.100 is a commercial forensic tool that was used to 
extract and examine both the iOS and the Android phone. 
Oxygen Forensic Detective is a specialised mobile forensics 
tool developed by Oxygen Forensics Inc and utilised by 
professional digital forensic investigators in law enforcement. 
The specific extraction capabilities for the tool range 
depending on the device being analysed, but in general it 
provides several options for extraction depending on the 
individual device requirements, and provides highly detailed 
and clear visual representations of the data both in the 
applications user interface and in the reports it can produce. 
Various viewers are built into Oxygen Forensic Detective, 
allowing users to view the contents of files such as SQL 
databases within the program and make reports specifically 
from the contents [31]. 
MOBILedit Forensic Express [32] version 6.1.0.15480 is 
a commercial forensic tool that was used to extract and 
examine the iPhone device. MOBILedit can create a logical 
and physical acquisition of a mobile device and can recover 
deleted files as well as retrieve mobile data. It is used widely 
across law enforcement in over 70 countries and is also used 
in military investigations [32]. 
Andriller version 3.0.3 [33] is an Android specific 
proprietary forensic tool developed by the software team of 
the same name and allows for data extraction from both rooted 
and unrooted Android devices. This tool was used to extract 
and examine the Android device. Data extracted from suitable 
devices is extracted to a directory of the users choosing in the 
form of several different reports, and folders for shared 
storage data. Various utility tools come alongside the 
extraction capabilities, such as a screenshot function, 
lockscreen decoders and specific database decoders for a 
specific list of supported applications and sources. For the 
purposes of this experiment a trial licence was acquired to use 
the full version for a time period of 30 days. 
FTK Imager version 4.1.1.1 is a freeware disk analysis tool 
produced by AccessData [34] as part of their Forensic Toolkit 
product range. This forensic tool was used to extract and 
examine the Android phone. While only a free version of the 
products AccessData have produced, FTK Imager is still a 
versatile tool for extracting disk and RAM images, as well as 
analysing existing forensic images. Lacking elaborate 
methods of displaying extracted data, FTK displays the 
filesystem of the chosen image files and provides both 
plaintext and hexadecimal viewing panes to display file 
contents. While not intrinsically advertised as a mobile 
forensic tool, FTK Imager is still capable of analysing an 
existing image file extracted from a mobile device and could 
serve as a mobile forensic analysis tool if necessary.  
Autopsy 3.0.8 [35] was used to analyse an forensic image 
file. Autopsy is the graphical frontend for a set of Linux 
forensics tools called the Sleuthkit. This contains tools that 
allow for the recovery of deleted data. Autopsy also allows for 
the processing of unallocated space, which is an important part 
of the analysis as ephemeral messaging functions rely on the 
deletion of data. Artefacts such as deleted files sent as 
attachments to messages can be recovered using Autopsy [14]. 
Kali Linux is not a forensic tool, instead an operating 
system that was used for forensic analysis on the Android 
device. It can produce disk and mobile devices images through 
the use of the DD command, which serves to create a bit for 
bit copy of a file or directory. Accessing a mobile device to 
utilise this method of imaging requires several other tools, 
Android debug bridge and BusyBox, on top of rooting the 
device to allow direct access to the mobile devices root 
directory. As a result, imaging a mobile device with this 
method is highly questionable in its forensic soundness, 
however it is still a viable technique in the event a device 
requires imaging without specialised tools and equipment. 
While not being assessed as a forensic tool, given its only 
functionality is copying data bit for bit, both Autopsy and FTK 
Imager would be using image files produced by Kali Linux for 
their analysis as an example of full data extraction and 
analysis with freeware tools [36][37].  
D. NIST Measurements 
NIST, otherwise known as the National Institute of 
Standards & Technology, is an institution based on 
technological and scientific advancement. They provide data 
and professional standards of technology for multiple 
scientific fields, including the forensic sciences. To ensure the 
quality and functionality of the tools, equipment and practices 
utilised [11]. NIST produced a set of standards detailing ten 
baseline functionality standards and twenty-two optional 
standards for assessing tools on their suitability for mobile 
forensic extraction and examination. The main goal of the 
guidelines is to determine a tool’s ability to accurately acquire 
specific data objects populated onto the feature phone, smart 
phone, tablet or credit cards. Before proceeding with the 
examination of the target mobile device for this research, the 
tools would be assessed with the ten baseline test assertions, 
MDT-CA-01 through to MDT-CA-10. For example, the first 
test assertion, MDT-CA-01, indicates if a mobile device 
forensic tool provides the user with an “Acquire All” data 
objects acquisition option then the tool should complete the 
logical or filesystem acquisition of all data objects without 
error.  An accurate acquisition copies means that the bytes of 
the acquired data object are identical to the bytes of the data 
object on the device. The NIST guidelines also have some 
optional assertions focussing on physical extraction ability of 
a tool, which were omitted for the tests as all versions of the 
tools used for analysis lacked those features by default. 
 E. Testing Methodology 
The iPhone 6s was extracted and examined first using 
Snapchat on the iPhone device. For this application, three 
contacts were added and two of those contacts had 
communication sending picture messages, as well as written 
messages back and forth. Ten picture messages were 
exchanged, three written messages were marked as ‘saved’, 
while one of other messages was not saved. The username for 
the mobile owner was ‘aimee_test19’. For the Snapchat, the 
ephemeral artefacts were the picture messages for the 
investigation. 
Cyberdust had a total of eleven messages exchanged. Two 
of the messages were picture messages. The username for the 
mobile owner was linked directly to the mobile number of the 
device instead of an account like Snapchat.  
Confide had a total of seven messages exchanged on the 
iPhone device. Like Cyberdust, here also the username for the 
mobile owner was linked directly to the mobile number. For 
the investigation’s purpose, only the secure messaging feature 
was used, where messages were encrypted and deleted after 
24 hours.  
Oxygen Forensic outputs a GUI home page, which 
displays the kinds of information that has been extracted, 
allowing an investigator to navigate around the mobile 
contents easily. The ‘Applications’ tile was selected to 
investigate the three Ephemeral applications mentioned 
previously, including any data the applications held of the 
user, conversation data, etc. Once the ‘Applications’ tile was 
examined, the ‘Passwords’ tile was selected and examined. 
This was to see if any passwords were stored within the three 
EMAs to test the general security of the applications.  
The same extraction process was completed in 
MOBILedit Forensic Express [8]. Unlike Oxygen, 
MOBILedit outputs the mobile device extraction into a report. 
However, there was a contents page produced within the 
report. There was also a separate section for both 
‘Applications’ and ‘Passwords’ similarly to Oxygen. Both of 
those sections were examined. In the next stage of the 
examination, a general keyword search was made within the 
Oxygen and MOBILedit in search for artefacts. The keywords 
searched included ‘Snapchat’, ‘Dust’ and ‘Confide’. This was 
completed in case any other information relating to the 
applications was extracted and missed previously. The 
application names were used for the searches, as in a real-life 
scenario the digital forensic investigator may not know the 
contents of the messages and may be left with no other search 
options other than the application names. 
Next, the Android device was extracted and examined by 
the nominated forensic tools.  Assessment of the supported 
messaging capabilities within each application was performed 
and then messaging transcripts for each of the applications 
were produced, detailing the messages and attachments sent 
between the Android phone and a personal phone. Each 
application would be used to produce five distinct text-based 
messages, exchanges of specifically named image files, and 
then exchanges of distinct audio messages and document files 
for the apps that supported audio and file-based attachments. 
Once the test data was created to the specifications of the 
transcripts, the device was then forensically analysed, first by 
the proprietary forensic tools and then the freeware forensic 
tools. The forensically valuable artefacts were recorded 
through screenshots and were extracted, if necessary, to 
identify contents, in the case of the media file attachments. 
Once thorough analysis of the device was performed with all 
four chosen tools, the applications were then uninstalled from 
the device to simulate anti-forensic activity, after which a 
second stage of analysis was then performed to see if any of 
the artefacts recovered in the first stage of analysis were still 
recoverable in a forensically valuable form. 
IV. RESULTS 
This section covers the key findings from the analysis 
described in Section III. The results will be broken down into 
multiple sections: iOS results from forensic tools used to 
extract the iPhone 6s, Android results from the forensic tools 
used to extract the Android Vodafone VF695. 
A. Oxygen Forensic for iOS 
A list of applications on the mobile device was found in 
the ‘Applications’ tile using Oxygen.  Snapchat was the first 
application to be investigated. Figure 1 shows Snapchat data. 
Four areas were highlighted within the figure. This included 
the login username ‘aimee_test19’, that was used to log into 
Snapchat and detection of an ‘offensive words’ used in 
messages. The next highlighted section was the evidence that 
there was messaging communication between a user 
‘aimee_test19’ and another user. The final highlighted section 
shows a chat deletion message count with a value of one, 
which indicates that a message was deleted by the user, which 
was a true case. A general search of the extracted mobile 
device was conducted using the search feature on Oxygen 
Forensics. The findings included general application data 
within the file browser, such as the Snapchat library, stickers, 
etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Snapchat artefacts in Oxygen. 
The next application investigated was Cyberdust. 
Previously, Snapchat appeared in the ‘Applications’ tile on 
Oxygen displaying itself as a normal application. However, 
with Cyberdust only the application folder was recognised, 
and Cyberdust was not acknowledged as a full application like 
Snapchat, however the folder proved there was evidence of an 
application called Cyberdust being present on the mobile 
device. This could be because the application did not require 
a username and password to log in, rather the user’s mobile 
 number instead, which therefore meant the phone did not 
identify it as an application in the same way as Snapchat, 
where it requires a username and password. Figure 2 shows 
results from a general search of the word ‘dust’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cyberdust general search Oxygen 
Figure 3. Confide general search Oxygen. 
 The results from the file browser show private folder 
pathway names. This acknowledges the existence of the 
application itself within the mobile device, but it does not have 
definitive messages between two users. However, as Figure 2 
highlights, both ‘Google’ and ‘FireBaseMessaging’ were in 
the private folders. FireBase, formerly known as Google 
Cloud Messaging, is a cross-platform cloud solution for 
messaging [38]. This means that the data from the application 
could be deleted on the mobile device itself, but data may be 
uploaded elsewhere in the cloud and therefore access could be 
granted through that, but this needs to be explored further. For 
this investigation however, it was proven that the application, 
Cyberdust, was a messaging application, but there was no 
evidence of messages between two users. Additionally, Figure 
2 highlights a ‘Generic’ password in the search. This shows 
that the application has stored a password, most likely the 
user’s password, but has encrypted it with a token. 
The last application investigated was Confide. Similarly, 
to Cyberdust, there was little evidence to prove the application 
Confide existed under the ‘Applications’ tile. Unlike 
Snapchat, the only data Confide showed within the 
Applications tile was a private pathway. Figure 3 shows 
results from a general search of the word ‘Confide’. The 
results showed general application files in private folders 
within the file browser. The number ‘+17752040571’ in 
Figure 3 is a verification text message from the application 
itself to verify the user's account. Even though there was 
evidence that the Confide was installed in the phone, no 
application specific communication between users or user log 
in details was recovered. There were however, four passwords 
that were linked to the application Confide. Three being 
generic and one being an Internet password. The passwords 
could have been the user login password, but the passwords 
were encrypted. Therefore, the passwords were not visible and 
were secure for the user’s account. 
 
B. MOBILedit Forensic Express for iOS 
The next part of the investigation was to examine the 
mobile device and the applications under examination using 
MOBILedit Forensic Express. Once the report generated from 
MOBILedit, the next step in the investigation was to navigate 
to the applications section of the report focusing on Snapchat, 
Cyberdust and Confide. The first application investigated was 
Snapchat. Figure 4 shows the accounts used to log in to 
Snapchat and the list of contacts and the pathways to “plist”, 
where the contact’s information was stored. 
Figure 4 proves that the mobile device was linked to a 
Snapchat account with the username ‘aimee_test19’, and both 
victim and suspect were likely to had communication as the 
names (username blackened out) appeared on the contact log 
of the phone. This finding would let further interrogation to 
the suspect during the investigation. Similarly to Oxygen, 
MOBILedit also found general application artefacts under 
private folders, but nothing significant that contributed to the 
investigation. The next application that was looked at within 
MOBILedit was Cyberdust. Figure 5 shows Cyberdust 
application data and the account the mobile device linked to 
the application. As Figure 5 displays, one account was 
evidently linked from the mobile device to the application. 
This proves the mobile user did use the application and also 
had an account. However, there were no account details 
recovered from that section of the report and unlike Snapchat, 
no contacts were found either, when the user did in fact have 
one contact on the application. However, this may be because 
the user contact was directly through a mobile number, which 
was already in the mobile user’s general phone contact list. 
Therefore, the contact may not have been stored on the 
application itself. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Snapchat data in MOBILedit. 
Figure 5. Cyberdust application in MOBILedit. 
Some data was recovered from the ‘Passwords’ section 
within the generated report as shown in Figure 6. The 
“Password” had the label of “PhoneNumber”. The data itself 
was the mobile user’s unencrypted phone number. No other 
data was found in the passwords section of the report. Since 
the phone number was stored by the application, it shows 
evidence of a user account on the mobile device. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6. Phone number recovery in Cyberdust. 
The last application MOBILedit investigated on the 
mobile device was Confide. Figure 7 displays Confide within 
the application list generated by MOBILedit. Unlike Snapchat 
and Cyberdust, the generated report displayed no information 
on contacts or accounts within Confide. Similar to the finding 
by Oxygen, Figure 6 suggests that there was little evidence 
that the mobile device had an account with the application. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Confide application data MOBILedit. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Phone number and password artefacts in Confide. 
Figure 8 displays the mobile number and the password 
artefact recovered from the application. The account was the 
mobile user’s unencrypted phone number, and the password 
was the user password for the created account for the 
application. The password was also unencrypted. This 
suggested that the application have stored the user password 
unsafely. 
C. NIST Measurements for iOS 
MOBILedit met all nine NIST measurement requirements 
tested in this research, while Oxygen did not, yet Oxygen did 
meet most of them. Comparisons of all nine test cases have 
been reported in Table II. MOBILedit provided the user with 
a “Select All” individual data objects (MDT-CA-02) while 
completing the logical or filesystem acquisition, it also 
provided the ability to “Select Individual” data objects (MDT-
CA-03) for acquisition; in both of these cases Oxygen failed.  
 
TABLE II.  NIST TEST  RESULTS (IOS) 
Measurements 
tested 
NIST test assertions applications 
Were the requirements met?  
(Y = Yes N = No) 
Oxygen Forensic 
Detective 
Enterprise 
MOBILedit 
Forensic Express 
MDT-CA-01 Y 
Y 
MDT-CA-02 N 
Y 
MDT-CA-03 N 
Y 
MDT-CA-04 N 
Y 
MDT-CA-05 Y 
Y 
MDT-CA-06 Y 
Y 
MDT-CA-07 Y 
Y 
MDT-CA-08 Y 
Y 
MDT-CA-09 Y Y 
 
In the fourth test case (MDT-CA-04), where MBOILedit 
had a success over Oxygen, during data acquisition when 
 connectivity between the mobile and tool was disrupted; a 
notification was given to alert the user. Both tools could 
successfully present all supported data elements in useable 
formats via preview pane or generated report, as required by 
NIST measurement test id MDT-CA-05. Both tools also 
reported other test cases, such as reporting equipment related 
information and hash values for the data objects (MDT-CA-
09). 
D. Oxygen Forensic for Android 
The mobile device extracted using Oxygen showed some 
interesting forensic evidence. A physical acquisition was 
performed on the device using Oxygen, and it was found that 
the most relevant pieces of the recovered data were found in 
Wire, which had records of every single communication 
stored within a log file by the name of “internalLog0.log” 
(Figure 9), and a storage cache (Figure 10) for various media 
files including the image and document files received and the 
audio message sent, despite those attachments being shown as 
deleted in application. All three of the identified files could be 
extracted, and the audio file could be played to hear the 
original contents of the message. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. internalLog0.log Wire communications in Oxygen 
 
Figure 10. Wire cache and media files in Oxygen 
The remaining items of recovered evidence were that of 
account data, recovered from various log or config-based files 
within the application data areas of the device storage. This 
data revealed the username, account ID and mobile number 
for the registered Facebook Messenger account and the 
mobile number for the Signal account (Figure 11). Analysis of 
messenger and Signal program files revealed no data relevant 
to the conversations undertaken, nor any account information.  
Keyword search analysis of the image provided few results as 
shown in Figure 12.  
 
 Figure 11. Messenger and Signal in Oxygen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Full Oxygen keyword search results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Confide account data in Oxygen 
Figure 14.   Wire account data in Oxygen 
Analysis of the Confide program files displayed no data 
relevant to the conversations but did contain a config file 
detailing the email registered to the confide account as well as 
the sign-up date, username and account ID (Figure 13). For 
 Wire, the username, account ID, mobile number and email 
address for the registered account were also found (Figure 14). 
Analysis of the Wire program files revealed an SQL 
database named “ZGlobal.db” containing the locations of 
media files sent/received by the target device within a cache, 
specifically the jpg image received (Book0002.jpg), the Audio 
message sent (“Audio test 1”) and the document file received 
(Document0003.doc), as shown in Figure 15.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Oxygen analysis of ZGlobal.db  
Only the images sent by each application were 
consistently found as they were within device storage. 
Attempts to extract the media files from the Wire directory 
using the cache file paths and file names provided by the 
ZGlobal.db database were successful, and each file could be 
carved from the image, however both “Book0002.jpg” and 
“Document0003.doc” were encrypted and could not be 
opened. The Audio message file on the other hand was 
unencrypted and once extracted could be played to hear the 
original message. 
E. Oxygen Anti-forensic for Android 
Upon completing prior testing with the applications 
installed, all four apps were uninstalled via the Google play 
store and the device was imaged again for analysis. Both 
Facebook messenger and Signal were absent from the 
messengers section of the GUI after uninstallation leaving the 
account data absent from extraction. The program files for all 
four applications had also been removed from the file system, 
however the Wire media cache remained semi intact as 
recovered data. Searching for the Wire media files by cache 
name and manually searching for the cache in recovered space 
did reveal the image and audio message files (Figure 16).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Oxygen extracted deleted Wire media files  
Both the identified image and audio files could be 
extracted, and the audio message could be played to hear its 
original content.  Each application transcript, as well as the 
email address and mobile number associated with the 
applications, was then inputted into the search bar, with the 
results of the search being far less than the prior analysis 
(Figure 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.   Oxygen Anti-forensics image keyword search result 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.   Oxygen Anti-forensics image recovered Confide.xml 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.   Oxygen Anti-forensics image Wire account data 
The Wire messages that had previously appeared within 
internalLog0.log did not exist, leaving no trace of the text-
based communications, however, searches for the mobile 
number and email address revealed both a recovered copy of 
the Confide.xml file (Figure 18) and showed a deleted file that 
appeared to display all the account details for Wire (Figure 
19). 
F. Autopsy and FTK for Android 
An Autopsy case file was produced for the Android 
device and both DD extracted partitions were added as 
evidence. Analysis of the image files provided similar 
evidence as Oxygen Forensic Detective: the Confide.xml 
config file containing the registered email address was 
discovered, as well as the “ZGlobal.db” database containing 
cache locations for the Wire media files. Further analysis 
with a keyword search of the application transcripts also 
revealed the same data, with the sent media files and entire 
Wire transcript being identified. Extraction of the media files 
also proved the same, with both the jpg file and Document 
 file remaining encrypted but the mp4 file remaining audible. 
The Autopsy analysis differed only in the absence of 
identified Signal account data and in a lack of Mobile 
number/Account ID data for Facebook messenger. 
FTK Imager was run and both partition images were 
added as image files for analysis; however, the volume 
containing the application data stored within mmcblk0.dd 
was unavailable in analysis. As a result, accessing the 
“Confide.xml”, “ZGlobal.db” and “internalLog0.log” files 
was impossible. However, partition mmcblk1 was complete 
and as a result it was possible to access the Wire media cache 
and extract the media files to the same effect as Oxygen and 
Autopsy. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 20. Extracted Wire cache files via Autopsy (Left)                                       
and FTK Imager (Right) 
G. Autopsy and FTK Anti-forensics Results for Android  
Autopsy revealed only slightly fewer results, once again 
similar to the Oxygen Forensic Detective results. Keyword 
searches for both the test data transcripts and for the known 
account details failed to find the “internalLog0.log” file, 
which had stored the Wire conversations, however it did still 
manage to find both the deleted “Confide.xml” file  and the 
deleted Wire file containing its account details. Analysis of the 
Wire cache was also possible, and revealed more deleted 
records that Oxygen seemed to, enabling the extraction of the 
media files once again. Both the jpg image file and document 
files remained unreadable, and the mp4 audio message 
remained unencrypted and fully audible (Figure 21). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Autopsy extracted deleted Wire media files 
FTK Imager revealed identical results as before, when 
apps were not deleted. The mmcblk0 partition still appeared 
partially unreadable, making analysis of partition specific files 
impossible, but access to the deleted Wire cache was still 
possible to identify and extract the cache contents. The 
extracted files behaved as they had before, with all except the 
mp4 file being encrypted or otherwise unreadable. 
H. Andriller Results for Android  
The results from Andriller where negligible compared to 
those in Oxygen, with only account data and Facebook 
messages being shown in the main report, and no storage data 
being extracted despite the option being selected before 
extraction was performed. The account data recovered 
provided no actual account details, and instead just provided 
evidence that Facebook messenger and signal were installed, 
and the Facebook messages extracted were only the 
unencrypted messages sent between the original Nokia 1 
device and the personal device, on top of the account 
confirmation messages, as shown in Figure 22. Andriller 
revealed no forensically valuable evidence relevant to the 
uninstalled applications, account data that was previously 
extracted was absent and once again was missing shared 
storage data for manual analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Andriller Facebook messages extraction 
I. NIST Measurements for tools used for Android 
As the baseline test assertions, MDT-CA-1 to 10 are the 
lowest levels of functionality that NIST determined a mobile 
forensics analysis tool should have, Oxygen Forensic 
Detective managed to meet all of the test assertions except 
MDT-CA-10 (Table III). However, some of the assertions in 
the other tools such as FTK, Autopsy and Andriller were not 
relevant and therefore could not be tested. 
TABLE III.  ANDROID PROPRIETARY TOOLS 
NIST Test Guidelines: Oxygen Vs. Andriller   
NIST Base 
Guidelines 
 Oxygen Forensic 
Detective 
Andriller 
3.0.3  
MDT-CA-01 Pass N/A 
MDT-CA-02 Pass N/A 
MDT-CA-03 Pass Pass 
MDT-CA-04 Pass Fail 
MDT-CA-05 Pass Pass 
MDT-CA-06 Pass Pass 
MDT-CA-07 Pass Pass 
MDT-CA-08 Pass Pass 
MDT-CA-09 Pass (Inconsistently) Fail 
MDT-CA-10 N/A N/A 
 
 TABLE IV.  ANDROID FREEWARE TOOLS 
NIST Test Assertions: FTK Imager Vs. Autopsy   
NIST Base 
Guidelines 
 FTK 
Imager 
4.1.1.1 
Autopsy 
4.8.0 
MDT-CA-01 N/A N/A 
MDT-CA-02 N/A N/A 
MDT-CA-03 N/A N/A 
MDT-CA-04 N/A N/A 
MDT-CA-05 Pass Pass 
MDT-CA-06 Fail Fail 
MDT-CA-07 Fail Pass 
MDT-CA-08 Pass Pass 
MDT-CA-09 Fail Pass 
MDT-CA-10 N/A Pass 
As shown in Table IV, being purely analysis tools, both 
Autopsy and FTK Imager were unable to be assessed by 
MDT-CA-1 to 4 by default. Andriller failed two of the seven 
applicable assertions, MDT-CA-4 & MDT-CA-9; Autopsy 
failed one of the six applicable assertions, MDT-CA-6, and 
FTK Imager failed three of the five applicable assertions, 
MDT-CA-6/7/9. Considering both the failed assertions, and 
the assertions that could not be applied due to a lack of tool 
functionality, Oxygen Forensic Detective is by far the most 
reliable by the standards set by NIST, with Andriller second, 
Autopsy third and FTK Imager fourth. 
J. Comparison of tools for iOS 
For iOS, both tools used in the mobile investigation output 
slightly different results. While neither recovered messages 
from the EMAs tested, both of them recovered artefacts 
elsewhere. Oxygen and MOBILedit successfully recovered 
data on all applications: Snapchat, Cyberdust and Confide. 
While different artefacts and data were detected, the fact that 
no physical copies of messages were recovered in any 
application, using either of the forensic tools, proves how 
efficient EMAs are at protecting user privacy. Oxygen 
detected offensive words being sent/received, this would be 
useful within a cyberbullying case, even though the message 
itself was not recovered. The evidence detected of 
communication between the mobile user and another contact 
would also prove useful as the application would be able to 
tell detectives who the mobile user had been in contact with. 
This would also be useful in a cyberbullying case, as there 
would be evidence the ‘bully’ had contact with the victim. 
Furthermore, the detection of Cloud messaging within 
Cyberdust suggested that although physical messages were 
not recovered within the application, the messages could have 
been uploaded elsewhere to a Cloud network and access could 
be gained through the network. This would provide a chance 
for messages to perhaps be recovered in a cyberbullying case.  
For Confide, Oxygen displays the password in encrypted 
format, while the MOBILedit shows it in unencrypted format. 
MOBILedit also recovered an unencrypted version of the 
registered mobile number, which Oxygen could not. For the 
Snapchat, MOBILedit detected account data, such as the 
mobile user’s username and the contact list within the 
application. However, MOBILedit failed to detect other 
evidences, such as offensive words, evidence of 
communication between the mobile user and another contact, 
and the evidence of a message being deleted. 
K. Comparison of tools for Android  
The application analysis performed revealed that, for the 
most part, the EMAs are secure enough to keep evidence of 
user activity and message contents from being identified. 
Considering the successfully identified/extracted data, the 
NIST assessments and the overall forensic soundness of the 
tools and reliant imaging techniques therein, in the case of 
FTK and Autopsy, Oxygen Forensic Detective appears to be 
the most capable and reliable tool of the four, able to both non-
invasively image suspect devices and analyse the extracted 
images in detail up to the relevant baseline specifications set 
by NIST. Furthermore, the evidence analysis shown by 
Oxygen was rivalled only by Autopsy, which while 
impressive for a fully freeware tool still required a pre-created 
image in order to perform analysis. The second freeware 
analysis tool, FTK Imager, was lacking in its analysis due to 
an inability to properly analyse the mmcblk0 partition, which 
contained the majority of the identifiable evidence. As a result, 
use of FTK Imager as a backup to proprietary tools would be 
ill advised when Autopsy is far more accessible as an 
immediate download, instead of FTK Imager’s request-based 
download, and provides more analysis functionality. While 
not entirely limited to DD images for analysis, without a prior 
image being obtained through a dedicated imaging tool both 
FTK Imager and Autopsy would be reliant on the invasive and 
potentially forensically unsound technique of rooting and DD 
extracting a device image, which potentially justifiable in 
court given the right situation still carries great risk of being 
thrown out as compromised evidence. Despite the potentially 
evidence unsafe methods required by the freeware tools, both 
FTK Imager and Autopsy provided more forensically valuable 
data than Andriller, which did not extract any filesystem data 
required for the in-depth analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, experiments were performed to assess the 
forensically valuable artefacts that could be recovered from 
EMAs using various proprietary and freeware tools. The 
results show that with the rooted Android phone, more 
artefacts were recovered compared to iOS phone, which was 
not jailbroken. On iOS platform, no full ephemeral messages 
were recovered with either of the tools, but other significant 
artefacts were found, which proved rather interesting to the 
investigation. One significant finding was that of the 
Snapchat’s ‘offensive words’ detection, which may help aid 
evidence in cyberbullying cases to prove inappropriate 
language may have been used towards a victim. In forensic 
investigations, the investigators have to look very deep into 
the data and have a lot of patience, as one small piece of 
evidence could change the case, such as the offensive word. 
For iOS, a physical acquisition may have provided a much 
more thorough investigation to recover deleted data. 
 The forensic analysis conducted on the Android device 
also did not recover full ephemeral communications on the 
applications examined, except for the application ‘Wire’. A 
log file was recovered containing full vocal communication 
sent and received on the application. Facebook Messenger 
was acknowledged as an application, and some details of the 
user were also stored, however no evidence of 
communication was found. This was interesting, as Snapchat 
(which is of similar popularity to Facebook Messenger) 
managed to recover some evidence of communication 
between two users using a logical acquisition on Oxygen, but 
it seems Oxygen could not find such communication on 
Facebook Messenger. This could contradict the fact physical 
acquisitions are supposed to recover more information. 
However, it could be the way the application is designed in 
itself. It does appear that Facebook Messenger has a more 
secure design, in which messages cannot be recovered even 
through a physical acquisition. 
During experimentation of Android device, automatic tool 
analysis and analysis of application files revealed that from all 
four EMAs varying amounts of account data were recovered, 
of which Confide and Wire provided the most valuable data, 
then Facebook messenger and then Signal with the least. From 
this, a moderate range of recoverable forensic evidence has 
been identified for the four chosen EMAs, displaying where 
they may be recovered from and what data the evidence 
specifically relates to. During the anti-forensic investigation, 
when apps were deleted from the Android phone, some 
valuable artefacts were recovered. For example, the media 
files in Wire could still be recovered but the log file was not.  
Furthermore, the use of the proprietary and freeware 
forensic tools, combined with the NIST assessments, provides 
insight into the capabilities and level of professional 
functionality that each tool holds, allowing for greater 
understanding of the available tools in Android and iOS based 
mobile device analysis and what these tools can do with regard 
to the extraction and analysis of ephemeral data. In total this 
study fills the gaps of knowledge that resides in the analysis 
of both popular EMAs and analysis of those applications via 
freeware forensic tools to the standard proprietary options. 
Further research on this topic should focus on better filling the 
gaps of knowledge regarding the recovery of ephemeral 
communication data from applications not included in this 
study, or further research on the applications used within this 
study to identify if app specific decryption capabilities could 
assist in identifying ephemeral communications from the 
applications that did not yield communication evidence. 
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